We examine the decisions of financial advisor hiring by U.S. acquirers in cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Our investigation focuses on the choice between financial advisors indigenous to target home countries (local advisors) and those foreign to target home countries (foreign advisors). We develop and test hypotheses about the determinants and consequences of acquirer choices based on the relative strengths and weaknesses of the two options. We find that acquirers are more likely to retain local advisors in transactions where they face greater information asymmetry and uncertainties as reflected by deal and target home country characteristics, and are more likely to hire foreign advisors in relatively larger deals. These results are consistent with local advisors having an information advantage while foreign advisors having more expertise in handling larger and more complex transactions. Local advisor hiring is also more likely when there is a greater supply of them. Regarding the consequences of local vs. foreign advisor hiring, we find that acquirers advised by local advisors experience significantly higher announcementperiod abnormal returns, but only in deals where acquirers have greater difficulties understanding and valuing targets. We also find that local advisor hiring reduces the propensity of acquirers to use stock as the method of payment.
Introduction
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are among the largest investments made by firms and as such can have significant shareholder value ramifications (Jensen and Ruback (1983) , Jarrell, Brickley, Netter (1988) , Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) , and Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005) ). Since most firms and executives do not engage in these transactions on a frequent basis, they often retain the services of investment banks as financial advisors to help themselves navigate through the potentially complex and lengthy process. As a result, the incentives and roles of financial advisors, firms' decisions to hire them, and their impact on deal outcomes and shareholder value have been the subjects of continuing research efforts (see, e.g., Bowers and Miller (1990) , McLaughlin (1990 McLaughlin ( , 1992 , Servaes and Zenner (1996) , Rau (2000) , Kale, Kini, and Ryan (2003) , Bao and Edmans (2011) , and Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos (2011) ).
While these studies focus on U.S. domestic transactions, the M&As arena has become increasingly global over the years. In particular, cross-border M&As accounted for 45% of the world-wide deal volume in 2007, up from 23% in 1998 (Erel, Liao, and Weisbach (2011) ), which makes the financial advisor choice in these deals an important but overlooked issue. Moreover, acquiring firms face even greater challenges in cross-border transactions than in domestic deals.
They must contend with heightened information asymmetry about target firms and greater uncertainty about deal outcomes as a result of different and often lax accounting disclosure requirements and unfamiliar or even unpredictable industry, economic, cultural, legal, regulatory, and political environments. Consistent with these difficulties, Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) and find that cross-border acquirers perform significantly worse than acquirers in domestic M&As. These factors make the hiring of financial advisors a potentially even more critical decision in the cross-border setting than in domestic deals.
In this paper, we aim to fill a void in the literature by examining acquirers' choice of financial advisors in cross-border acquisitions. Specifically, we focus our investigation on the determinants and consequences of acquirers choosing a financial advisor indigenous to or headquartered in the target firm's home country as opposed to an investment bank foreign to the target's home country. From the acquirers' perspective, the choice between local and foreign advisors involves a trade-off of their relative strengths and weaknesses. On the one hand, foreign advisors are likely leading investment banks with global operations and vast experience and knowledge in M&A advising. Their expertise in M&As and the potential to leverage resources from other areas of their business may enable them to provide higher quality advisory services to acquiring firms that facilitate and improve the deal making process. In addition, because of their higher reputation and possibly more lucrative compensation packages, foreign banks may also be able to attract more talented employees, who can more ably advise acquirers throughout a M&A transaction. Consistent with these advantages, Kale, Kini, and Ryan (2003) and Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos (2011) find evidence in domestic acquisitions that acquirers advised by top-tier or "bulge bracket" investment banks experience superior returns. 1 On the other hand, local advisors potentially have advantages in helping cross-border acquirers overcome difficulties due to information asymmetry and unfamiliarity with target home countries. In M&As in general, acquirers face significant challenges in trying to determine how much to pay for targets when targets have private information about their true value and when there are uncertainties about deal synergy due to unpredictable market, industry, economic, and political factors. In fact, theses difficulties often induce acquirers to overpay for targets and result in value destruction for acquiring shareholders (Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) ). These problems are compounded in a cross-border setting, where acquirers have to deal with additional layers of information opacity and uncertainties due to different rules and regulations and industry, market and economic landscape in a foreign country.
Compared to foreign advisors, local advisors may be better positioned to help acquirers overcome these challenges for several reasons. First, while foreign advisors likely have more sizable and wide-ranging business on the global scale, local advisors may have a larger operation on the ground in the target home country. In particular, local advisors are likely to have offices and branches at more regional (provincial, state, or city) levels in their home countries, while most foreign banks may only have branches in the target country's capital or financial center.
This resource advantage can aid in local advisors' information production by making it more convenient and less costly to observe targets from a close range and have direct contacts with targets' employees, suppliers, and customers. Second, because of their deeper roots in their home countries and greater reaches through their regional branches, local advisors may have longerestablished connections and more extensive networks in the economic, financial, and political circles of target countries. These informal channels can facilitate local advisors' acquisition of soft and hard to verify information about targets and proposed transactions Moskowitz (1999, 2001) ). Third, while foreign advisors may have more M&A experience worldwide, the M&A advisory services of local advisors are likely to be focused in their home countries. As a result, local advisors may be better versed in conditions, regulations, environments, and transaction intricacies specific to their countries, and have a competitive advantage in alleviating the information asymmetry associated with targets and the uncertainties about deal outcomes and value creation.
Based on the above discussion, whether an acquirer hires a local or foreign bank as its financial advisor depends on both deal and target home country characteristics. More specifically, acquirers may be more likely to hire local advisors in deals or countries where they face greater informational challenges and are less familiar with target home countries. On the other hand, we expect the probability of foreign advisors hiring to be higher in situations where the overall deal execution is more difficult. For example, acquirers taking over relatively larger targets and engaged in more complex transactions are likely in greater needs of foreign advisors, who may enjoy advantages in such areas as deal structuring, financing, and post-acquisition integration.
In a sample of cross-border acquisitions by U.S. acquirers over the period of 1990 to 2009, we find that 27% of acquirers retain the service of local advisors, while 73% of acquirers hire foreign advisors. Most (85%) of foreign banks have offices or branches in the target home countries at the time of acquisition announcement, which is consistent with the importance of local presence and geographical proximity to targets in facilitating the provision of quality advisory service by investment banks.
In our first line of inquiry, we examine the factors influencing the local vs. foreign advisor choice by estimating a probit regression. We find that acquirers are more likely to retain local advisors in (i) diversifying acquisitions, (ii) hostile takeovers, (iii) tender offers, (iv) acquisitions of targets from high-tech industries, (v) countries with poorer accounting disclosure quality, and (iv) larger countries as measured by total area. Acquirers face greater informational challenges when evaluating targets from other industries (as in (i)), targets from high-tech industries that are inherently associated with more uncertainties and information asymmetry (as in (iv)), and targets with potentially questionable and hard to interpret financial reporting (as in (v)).
The information environment is also less than ideal for acquirers when they are unlikely to receive any inputs from target management resisting the takeovers (as in (ii)), and when they bypass target management to appeal directly to target shareholders (as in (iii)). In countries with larger geographic area, firms are more likely to be located in places far away from the country's capital or financial centers, increasing the value of local banks' potentially larger operation and deeper regional reaches in their home countries. In sum, the above findings are consistent with local advisors possessing advantages in helping acquirers overcome informational obstacles and navigate through deals with more uncertainties involved.
With respect to foreign advisors, we find that they are more likely to be chosen by acquirers when relative deal size is larger and when target home country's financial development is poorer. The effect of relative deal size is consistent with the interpretation that acquirers taking over relatively larger targets need more assistance in deal structure and financing and advice on 6 post-acquisition integration, areas in which foreign banks may excel. The effect of financial development in the target home country is consistent with the idea that when target home countries are financially undeveloped, there is likely a dearth of local investment banks that are capable of providing quality M&A advisory service, making foreign advisor hiring the preferred, if not the only available, choice for acquirers.
We then proceed to examine the consequences of the local vs. foreign advisor hiring decisions on acquiring shareholders. Following prior literature, we use the acquirer's announcement-period abnormal stock returns as a measure of the shareholder wealth effect of an acquisition. Given the relative strengths and weaknesses of the two choices discussed above, we expect the hiring of local advisors to have a positive effect on acquirer returns if compared to foreign advisors, their likely advantages in reducing information asymmetry and resolving deal uncertainties can outweigh their potential deficiency in skill and expertise in other dimensions of M&A advising, and vice versa. We also expect that any acquirer return differential attributable to local advisor hiring is more pronounced in deals where acquirers face greater information asymmetry.
Results from acquirer returns regressions show that acquirers advised by local banks experience higher announcement returns than those advised by foreign banks. This local-advisor effect is significant both statistically and economically, and it is robust to controlling for other potential determinants of acquirer returns. Moreover, consistent with our conjecture, the positive effect of local advisors on acquirer returns is largely concentrated in (i) diversifying acquisitions, where acquirers have greater difficulties understanding and valuing targets operating in other industries, (ii) acquisitions of targets from high-tech industries, which are associated with more uncertainty and information asymmetry by nature, and (iii) acquisitions of targets with higher information asymmetry based on multiple firm characteristics. Overall, our evidence suggests that the informational advantage of local advisors enables them to help acquirers make more informed cross-border acquisition decisions and create more shareholder value, especially in situations where acquirers face greater informational challenges.
2
Before we conclude that local advisor hiring has a causal effect on acquirer returns, we address the endogeneity of acquirers' decisions to hire local advisors. It is possible that the relation between local advisor hiring and acquirer returns is spurious and driven by certain "omitted" variables that are correlated with both the local advisor hiring decision and acquirer returns. From a conceptual standpoint, we find it unlikely that this omitted variable problem can account for our results, since any omitted variable needs to be able to explain not only the positive relation between local advisor hiring and acquirer returns but also the relation's crosssectional variation along the dimension of information asymmetry uncovered by our analysis.
Nevertheless, we directly deal with the endogeneity problem by estimating a two-stage least square (2SLS) regression, where we exploit variations in local vs. foreign advisor hiring decisions that are driven by factors unrelated to acquirer returns. More specifically, we select two instrumental variables for the acquirer's choice of local advisors. One is the target home country's financial development, which proxies for the supply of local advisors, and the other is the target home country's total geographic area, which captures the importance of regional reaches of local advisors. The two instruments satisfy both the relevance condition and the exclusion restriction. Specifically, both variables are significantly related to the probability of local advisor hiring as discussed earlier in the paper. There is no direct and theoretically sensible linkage between either of the two variables and acquirer returns. In fact, neither variable is significantly related to acquirer returns. In addition, an over-identification test is unable to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of our instruments. After correcting for endogeneity, we find that local advisor hiring continues to have a significant and positive effect on acquirer returns.
Another potential issue that could affect our inference is that not all acquirers hire financial advisors, and this decision is unlikely to be random. As a result, our analysis could be subject to a sample selection bias since we focus on acquirers that engage investment banks for advisory services. To address this concern, we employ Heckman's (1979) two-step procedure to correct for any bias due to the non-randomness of our sample of acquirers that retain financial advisors. We find that our findings continue to hold.
Finally, we perform an additional analysis to provide further evidence on potential informational advantages of local advisors. Specifically, we examine whether local advisor hiring affects acquirers' choice of payment method for acquisitions. When there is information asymmetry and uncertainty about target value and deal synergy, acquirers have the incentive to use stock as a method of payment, since by doing so they can shift part of the overpayment risk to target shareholders (Hansen (1987) ). To the extent that the local advisors can mitigate the information problem more effectively than foreign advisors, they may reduce acquirers' needs for stock payment. Consistent with this intuition, we indeed find that acquirers with local advisors use less stock to finance their purchases.
We contribute to the literature on M&A advisors by providing first evidence on the choices of financial advisors by acquirers in cross-border M&As and the determinants and consequences of such choices. Given the increasing prevalence of cross-border transactions and the different set of challenges and obstacles they present to acquirers, our findings represent important additions to the existing literature that focuses on domestic acquisitions.
In addition, our differentiation between local and foreign advisors departs from prior research that largely focuses on the ranking or reputation of investment banks, 3 and it highlights the geographic origin or headquarters location of financial advisors as one characteristic that affects their ability to provide quality M&A advisory service to acquirers. Specifically, we find that acquirers facing greater information asymmetry and uncertainties in a transaction are more likely to retain local financial advisors and the hiring of such advisors has positive shareholder value effects on acquirers precisely in deals characterized by greater information asymmetry and uncertainties. These results are consistent with local advisors having informational advantages that enable them to better assist acquirers in overcoming informational challenges in cross-border acquisitions.
Viewed in this light, our paper is also related to a strand of literature examining the effects of geography on information acquisition and financial decision making. Much of the research in this literature focuses on the investment setting by studying the behavior and performance of mutual fund managers, individual investors and financial analysts Moskowitz (1999, 2001) , Huberman (2001) , Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) , Ivkovich and Weisbenner (2003) , Seasholes and Zhu (2010) , Malloy (2005) , and Bae, Stulz, and Tan (2007) ).
Other investigations explore the implications of geography in the corporate finance realm. For example, Butler (2008) examines the location of underwriters of municipal bonds and finds that local underwriters enjoy informational advantages in pricing these securities. Kang and Kim (2008) show that acquirers in partial block acquisitions engage in more corporate governance activities and create more value at targets when acquirers and targets are geographically closer. Kedia, Panchapagesan, and Uysal (2008) find that acquirers experience higher announcement returns when acquiring geographically closer targets, consistent with information advantages of acquirers due to their geographic proximity to targets.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data sources and acquisition sample. Section 3 examines the determinants of acquirers' choices between local quality and skill. They find significant evidence of persistence in advisor quality and skill. Ertugrul and Krishnan focus on individual investment bankers at M&A advisors and find that they are significantly associated with various performance measures and outcomes of acquisitions.
and foreign advisors. Sections 4 and 5 focus on the consequences of such choices, with Section 4 examining the effect of local vs. foreign advisor hiring on acquirer returns and Section 5 examining the effect on the method of payment. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Sample description
We start our sample construction by extracting acquisitions of publicly listed foreign targets by U.S. acquirers during the period of 1990 to 2009 from Thompson Financials' Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions Database. 4 We require that each acquisition in our sample satisfy the following criteria: (i) the acquirer has financial advisor information available from SDC, (ii) the deal value disclosed by SDC is more than $1 million and is at least 1% of the acquirer's market value of equity measured on the 11th trading day prior to the announcement date, 5 (iii) the acquirer controls less than 50% of target shares prior to the For investment banks providing no such information on their websites, we search Factiva for any news announcement that an investment bank opens an office or branch in a foreign country. 7 In their ranking, the top-tier financial advisors include Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, JP Morgan, Citi/Salomon Smith Barney, Credit Suisse First Boston, Lehman Brothers, and Lazard. 8 While it could be argued that acquisitions of Canadian targets by U.S. acquirers should not be considered as cross-border transactions because of the similarities between and geographic proximity of the two countries, Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) find that U.S. acquirers of Canadian targets perform significantly worse than Canadian acquirers of Canadian targets, especially among diversifying acquisitions. This suggests that even when acquiring targets from a country that is very similar and geographically close to the U.S., U.S. firms as cross-border acquirers still face greater challenges than domestic acquirers. Nevertheless, we repeat all our analysis while excluding acquisitions involving Canadian targets and our results continue to hold.
advisors and foreign advisors. Beginning in 1990, the number of cross-border acquisitions in each year generally increased annually until it reached its highest levels in late 1990s. It then declined during the early 2000s before returning to a second peak in 2006. This trend closely resembles that of the overall U.S. domestic acquisition activities documented by Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) . More importantly, the distributions of the two subsamples are quite similar, suggesting that any differences in characteristics between the two groups are unlikely to be accounted for by time effect. Nevertheless, we control for calendar year fixed-effects in our regression analyses. Definitions of these variables are in the Appendix. The average (median) acquirer in our sample has a book value of total assets of $18.704 (2.037) billion, a market-to-book ratio of 2.223
(1.677), a free cash flow to assets ratio of 1.7% (3.6%), and a leverage ratio of 15.6% (11.6%).
Acquirers hiring local advisors are generally similar to those hiring foreign advisors, except that the former are significantly smaller than the latter.
The average (median) transaction has a deal value of $1 (0.283) billion and a relative deal size of 39% (11.3%), and 19.3% (0%) of deal consideration is in the form of acquirer stock.
About 40% of acquisitions are diversifying, 8.2% are hostile bids, 48.4% are tender offers, and 11.5% involve competing bids. There are significant differences in many deal attributes between the local-advisor and foreign-advisor subsamples. For example, we find higher frequency of diversifying acquisitions, hostile takeovers, and tender offers in the local advisor subsample.
There is also some evidence that deals in the local advisor subsample are smaller and involve less stock payment.
Determinants of local vs. foreign advisor hiring by cross-border acquirers
and foreign advisors. To the extent that local advisors enjoy informational advantage over foreign advisors and are better able to alleviate the information asymmetry and uncertainty associated with a transaction, we expect acquirers to be more likely to retain the service of local advisors in deals presenting greater informational challenge to acquirers. On the other hand, to the extent that foreign advisors are likely leading investment banks with superior knowledge and expertise in other dimensions of M&A advising such as financing arrangements, deal structuring, and postdeal integration, we expect them to be hired more often by acquirers in larger and more complex deals where such advantages are more valuable.
To test these conjectures, we estimate a probit model to explain cross-border acquirers' decisions to hire local or foreign advisors. We include a number of deal and target home country characteristics as explanatory variables to proxy for information asymmetry and uncertainty associated with an acquisition. Deal level variables include indicators for diversifying acquisitions, hostile takeovers, tender offers, and acquisitions of targets from high-tech industries.
Firms acquiring from outside their industries may be more likely to hire local advisors since they are unfamiliar with target companies' business operation and industry environment. Bidders in hostile takeovers and tender offers tend to receive little or no input from target managers and boards as they encounter resistance from targets and usually bypass target insiders to directly appeal to target shareholders in these transactions. As a result, they may be more likely to turn to local advisors for help in uncovering target related information. Targets from high-tech industries can be difficult to understand and evaluate because much of their assets is intangible and growth options contribute to a large fraction of their value.
9
Country level variables include the target home country's accounting disclosure quality and total geographic area. Firms acquiring targets located in countries with poor disclosure quality have greater needs for local advisors, because these targets may have less transparent and 9 We use the definition of high-tech industries in Loughran and Ritter (2004) .
reliable financial reporting. Since targets in countries with larger geographic area are more likely to be located far away from the nation's capital or financial centers, the larger operation and greater regional reaches of local advisors can be more valuable in gathering information about targets, making local advisor hiring more likely. Since country area is highly skewed, we create a dummy variable (large country) that is equal to one for countries whose total area is greater than sample median.
The probit model also includes variables that may capture the size and complexity of a transaction. More specifically, we control for relative deal size and expect foreign advisor hiring to be more likely in relatively larger deals, since acquirers may have greater needs for assistance in deal structuring and financing and advice on post-acquisition integration. We also expect a higher frequency of foreign advisor hiring in hostile takeovers, tender offers, and acquisitions with competing bids, namely transactions that are more complex and where acquirers can use the experience and expertise of foreign advisors in handling these situations. Since hostile takeovers and tender offers can also be deals associated with greater information asymmetry, acquirer advisor choices are difficult to predict ex ante and ultimately depend on the tradeoff between deal complexity and information asymmetry.
The advisor choices of acquirers can also be related to their prior acquisition experience in the target home countries. Since firms may have developed a better understanding of a foreign country through prior acquisitions in that country, they may deem the informational advantage of local advisors less valuable and are more likely to hire foreign advisors. Therefore, we include the number of acquisitions made by an acquirer in the target home country over the past five years as an additional explanatory variable in the probit model. We also control for several acquirer characteristics, including firm size, market-to-book ratio, leverage ratio, and the ratio of free cash flow to assets.
While the discussion so far focuses on factors potentially driving the demand by acquirers for local advisors vis-à-vis foreign advisors, we also include in the probit model the target home country's GDP per capita to capture a possible supply effect. The idea is that countries with higher GDP per capita tend to have more developed financial markets and thus greater supplies of homegrown investment banks, leading to a higher probability of local advisor hiring.
We present the regression results of the probit model in Table 3 . The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one for deals in which acquirers are advised by local advisors and zero otherwise. We adjust standard errors for heteroskedasticity (White (1980) ) and target country clustering (Petersen (2009) ). Coefficient estimates and two-sided p-values are in column
(1) with the marginal effects in column (2). Consistent with local advisors possessing informational advantages, we find that the probability of an acquirer hiring a local advisor is significantly and positively related to proxies for the information asymmetry faced by the acquirer in a transaction. Specifically, we find that firms acquiring targets from unrelated industries, targets from high-tech industries and targets from countries with lower disclosure quality and larger geographic area are more likely to hire financial advisors from target home countries. 10 We also find that local advisors are more likely to be hired by acquirers in hostile deals and tender offers.
We also find that acquirers are more likely to hire foreign advisors in relatively larger deals and deals with competing bidders, although the second relation is not statistically significant.
These results are consistent with foreign advisors being able to provide acquirers with higher quality advisory services in larger and more complicated transactions. The supply of local advisors appears to factor significantly into acquirer advisor choices as well. Specifically, the probability of local advisor hiring increases with the target home country's financial development as proxied by the country's GDP per capita. 10 In untabulated results, we also find some evidence suggesting that local advisors may have an advantage in helping cross-border acquirers navigate through the regulations of the target home countries. Specifically, the probability of local advisor hiring is higher when targets are from regulated industries such as finance and utilities, but the relation is statistically significant only at the 10% level based on a one-sided test.
Consistent with our expectation, acquirers with more acquisition experience in the target home countries are less likely to hire local advisors, although the relation is not statistically significant. Finally, we find that larger acquirers and acquirers with higher market-to-book ratios and higher free cash flow to assets ratios are more likely to retain foreign advisors. One potential explanation for these results is that these firms are less financially constrained and decide to embark on a global expansion without a particular target firm or country in mind. As a result, they hire investment banks with global operations to help identify potential targets.
Overall, our evidence from this section suggests that acquirer choices between local and foreign advisors are the result of deliberate considerations of the advantages and disadvantages associated with the two options, and they are also driven by potential supplies of local advisors.
We next turn our attention to the consequences of acquirer advisor choices.
The effect of the local vs. foreign advisor choice on acquirer returns

Baseline analysis
In this section, we examine whether the choice between local and foreign advisors has any impact on acquiring shareholder gains. Given the relative strengths and weaknesses of these choices, we expect local advisor hiring to have a positive effect on acquirer returns if compared to foreign advisors, their likely advantages in reducing information asymmetry and resolving deal uncertainties can outweigh their potential deficiency in skill and expertise in other dimensions of M&A advising, and vice versa. In addition, we expect that any positive effect of local advisor hiring on acquirer returns is more pronounced in deals where acquirers face greater information asymmetry and uncertainties.
To test our hypotheses, we estimate regressions of acquirer returns against a dummy variable indicating whether acquirers retain the service of local advisors. We measure acquirer returns by market model adjusted stock returns around initial acquisition announcements (Brown and Warner (1985) ). We obtain the initial announcement dates from SDC. We compute three-day cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) during the window encompassed by event days (-1, +1), where event day 0 is the acquisition initial announcement date. We use the CRSP value-weighted return as the market return and estimate the market model parameters over the period from event day -210 to event day -11.
As shown in Panel C of Table 2 , the average CAR for the whole sample is 0.170% while the median is -0.022%. Neither is significantly different from zero. This is consistent with the findings in Doukas and Travlos (1988) , Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) , and that U.S. bidders experience no significant returns in cross-border mergers and acquisitions. However, when we divide the sample into deals with local advisors and with foreign advisors, we find that bidders hiring local advisors experience significantly higher abnormal returns around acquisition announcements. Specifically, the mean (median) CAR for bidders hiring local advisors is 0.933% (0.378%). Both the mean and the median are significantly different from zero at the 10% level. On the other hand, the mean (median) CAR for bidders assisted by foreign advisors is -0.105% (-0.040%). Moreover, the two subsamples are significantly different in both the mean and median CAR, with the two-sided p-values being 0.081 and 0.075, respectively. Therefore, the univariate analysis suggests that local advisors are able to more effectively mitigate information asymmetry and uncertainties faced by acquirers and help them create more value for shareholders through cross-border acquisitions.
Since the two subsamples also differ in a number of deal and acquirer characteristics that could be responsible for the difference in acquirer returns, for reliable inferences we resort to regression analysis of acquirer returns controlling for known and potential determinants of acquirer returns. Following prior studies (Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) and Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007)), we control for both acquirer and deal characteristics. The first category includes firm size, market-to-book ratio, leverage ratio, and the ratio of free cash flows to assets, all of which are measured at the fiscal year end prior to the acquisition announcement. The second category includes relative deal size, method of payment (percentage of deal value paid by stock), the industry relatedness of an acquisition, whether there are competing bids, whether an acquisition is hostile, and whether an acquisition takes the form of tender offer.
In light of the difference between the percentages of local and foreign advisors being in the bulge-bracket category, we also control for whether the acquirer's financial advisor is a bulgebracket investment bank. This will allow us to isolate any effect of local vs. foreign advisor hiring from the effect of investment bank ranking uncovered by many prior studies. For control variables, we find that relative deal size has a significantly positive effect on acquirer returns, and so does acquiring firm's leverage. We also find that bidder returns are significantly lower in hostile transactions and when a larger percentage of deal value is paid by stock. All these results are consistent with evidence from previous studies in the acquirer return literature (e.g., Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1983) , Travlos (1987) , Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) and Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) ).
Cross-sectional variation in the effect of local advisors on acquirer returns
In this subsection, we examine whether the positive effect of local advisor hiring on acquirer returns is more pronounced when acquirers face higher level of information asymmetry.
We expect the informational advantage of local advisors to be more valuable when it is more difficult for acquirers to understand and value targets. To test our conjecture, we interact the local-advisor dummy with measures of target information asymmetry and include the interaction terms as additional explanatory variables in the bidder return regressions. The first measure is an indicator for diversifying acquisitions. Firms acquiring targets in unrelated industries are less familiar with the targets' business operations and the local investment banks' information advantage is likely to be more beneficial under such circumstances. 11 In column (1) of table 5, we add the interaction of local-advisor dummy with the diversifying-acquisition dummy. We find that it has a significantly positive coefficient. On the other hand, the coefficient on the localadvisor becomes indistinguishable from zero. Therefore, it appears that the positive effect of local advisors on bidder returns is concentrated in diversifying acquisitions, supporting our conjecture that the informational advantages of local advisors are more valuable when acquirers expand into unrelated industries and thus must contend with greater informational challenges.
The second measure of target information asymmetry is an indicator for targets from high-tech industries, since the intangible assets and growth options of these firms make them difficult to understand and value for acquirers. We interact this dummy variable with the localadvisor dummy and include the interaction term as an additional explanatory variable in the acquirer returns regression. Results presented in column (2) of Table 5 show that the interaction term has a significant and positive coefficient, while the coefficient of the local-advisor dummy is still positive, though no longer significant. This is consistent with the information advantages of local advisors being more valuable to acquirers when targets are associated with greater information asymmetry.
Our third proxy of information asymmetry is an index that is constructed using four target characteristics: firm size, asset tangibility, market-to-book ratio (as a proxy for growth options), and cash-flow volatility. We expect firms with smaller size, lower asset tangibility, higher market-to-book ratios, and higher cash-flow volatilities to have a higher level of information asymmetry. Firm size is defined as the log transformation of the target's book value of assets.
Asset tangibility is equal to targets' book value of property, plant, and equipment divided by book value of assets. Market-to-book ratio is equal to targets' market value of assets divided by book value of assets. Cash-flow volatility is the standard deviation of the ratio of targets' operation cash flow over book value of assets during the past 5 years. All these variables are constructed using data from WorldScope and are measured at the fiscal year end immediately prior to the acquisitions. Since not all targets in our sample have financial data available in WorldScope, the sample size is reduced to 324.
We rank these 324 targets into deciles based on each of these four measures (decile 10 for most information asymmetry and decile 1 for least information asymmetry), and add the four individual decile ranks to obtain a composite rank for each target. We then create an indicator variable (high information asymmetry target) that is equal to one if a target's composite information asymmetry rank is in the top quartile of the sample. We interact this dummy variable with the local-advisor dummy and include the interaction term as an additional explanatory variable in the acquirer returns regression. Results presented in column (3) of Table 5 show that the interaction term has a significant and positive coefficient, while the coefficient of the localadvisor dummy is still positive, though no longer significant. This suggests that the information advantages of local advisors enable them to provide advisory services that are particularly helpful when acquirers face greater information asymmetry in evaluating targets.
Correcting for endogeneity of local advisor hiring
As we have shown in Section 3, acquirer decisions to hire local advisors are not random.
In other words, the local-advisor dummy that we focus on is endogenously determined, potentially biasing the coefficient estimates from OLS regressions. To address this concern, we employ a two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach. We use two target country-level variables as instruments for local advisor hiring. One variable is the log of GDP per capita of the target home country, as a proxy for the target country's financial development to capture the potential supply of homegrown investment banks. The other variable is the indicator for countries whose total area is above sample median (larger country). The probit analysis presented in Tale 3 indicates that both instruments are significantly related to the probability of acquirers choosing local advisors.
However, they do not appear to have direct and theoretically sensible relations with acquirer returns. In fact, when we include them in the bidder return regressions, neither has a significant coefficient estimate. This suggests that our instruments satisfy the exclusion restriction. Later we formally verify their exogeneity via an over-identification test. Table 6 presents the 2SLS regression results. The first stage probit model is nearly identical to the one presented in Table 3 , except that it includes the percentage of deal value paid with bidder stock and the bulge-bracket advisor dummy, two explanatory variables in the acquirer return regression. We continue to document significant and positive coefficient estimates for the log of GDP per capita and the indicator variable for larger country. The adjusted partial Rsquared attributed to the two instruments is 1.67%, statistically significant with a p-value of 0.044, suggesting that our country-level instruments satisfy the relevance condition. Having two instruments and only one endogenous variable allows us to run an over-identification test, which produces a Hansen's J statistics that is statistically indistinguishable from zero (p-value: 0.820).
This suggests that our country-level instruments also satisfy the exogeneity condition.
In the second stage regression of bidder returns, we replace the local-advisor dummy with the predicated probability from the first stage model. We find that the instrumented version of the local-advisor dummy continues to have a significant and positive effect on acquirer returns.
Therefore, the evidence from 2SLS regressions suggests that our findings are robust to correcting for endogeneity of local advisor hiring.
Correcting for potential sample selection bias
Our analysis so far utilizes a sample of acquisitions in which all acquirers retain financial advisors. However, acquirers do not enlist the advisory service of investment banks in all acquisitions. Since acquirers' decisions to engage investment banks or not are unlikely to be random, focusing on a subsample of deals where acquirers do hire financial advisors may subject our analysis and results to potential sample selection bias, especially if some of the factors driving acquirers' decisions to hire advisors are related to the outcome variables that we examine.
To address this concern, we employ Heckman's (1978) where the acquirers do not hire financial advisors. Other sample construction criteria are the same as outlined in Section 2. We merge this sample with our sample of 426 cross-border acquisitions where acquirers retain financial advisors. We next estimate a first-stage probit model on the combined sample to predict whether acquirers hire financial advisors or not. We then construct an inverse Mills' ratio (IMR) based on the coefficient estimates from the probit model and include it as an additional explanatory variable in a second-stage acquirer return regression. Results from this procedure are in Table 7 .
Panel A presents the regression results of the probit model. The dependent variable is equal to one for deals in which acquirers hire financial advisors and zero otherwise. The explanatory variables are the same as in Table 3 . We find that acquirers are more likely to hire financial advisors in relatively larger deals, hostile deals, and tender offers, consistent with M&A advisory service provided by investment banks being more valuable in these potentially more challenging transactions. In addition, we also find that acquirers with more acquisition experience in the target country are less likely to hire financial advisors, presumably because they have developed greater familiarity with and understanding of the target countries through prior transactions.
Panel B reports the coefficient estimates from the acquire returns regression with IMR as an additional control variable. We find that IMR has an insignificant coefficient, suggesting the absence of serious sample selection bias. Consistent with that, the local advisor dummy continues to have a significantly positive effect on acquirer returns, and the magnitude and statistical significance of the coefficient are both very similar to those reported in Table 4 . Therefore, our findings are robust to correction for potential sample selection bias due to our focus on acquisitions in which all acquirers retain financial advisors. 
The effect of the local vs. foreign advisor choice on deal payment method
In this section, we perform an additional analysis to provide corroborating evidence on the informational advantages of local advisors. Hansen (1987) argues that when there is information asymmetry about the true value of target assets, bidders can use stock as the M&A currency to share some of the overpayment risk with targets. To the extent that local advisors can utilize their information advantage to mitigate the information asymmetry that bidders face in valuing targets, we expect that bidders assisted by local advisors will be less likely to finance their purchases with stock.
To test this hypothesis, we estimate regressions with the percentage of transaction value paid by stock as the dependent variable and the local advisor dummy as the key explanatory 12 Our acquirer return analysis suggests that some U.S. acquirers fail to hire local advisors when it would be beneficial to do so. It is possible that these U.S. firms have a long-term relationship with some U.S. investment banks that is valuable in terms of fulfilling their future financing needs and providing favorable analyst coverage. As a result, they do not wish to risk damaging the relationship by choosing other investment banks as their financial advisors in cross-border acquisitions. Another possibility is that these U.S. acquirers fail to recognize the value of local advisors and end up making incorrect advisor choices. Poor decisions like this by acquirers are not entirely surprising in light of the evidence that mergers and acquisitions on average create little or no value for acquiring shareholders and many of them actually are value destroying for acquiring shareholders.
variable. We follow Faccio and Masulis (2005) to control for a series of determinants of the method of payment. In particular, a bidder has greater incentives to finance its acquisition with stock when its stock is overvalued (Myers and Majluf (1984) ). Therefore, we include the bidders' pre-announcement stock price runup, which is measured by the bidder's buy-and-hold abnormal return over the 200-day window (-210, -11) with the CRSP value-weighted market index as the benchmark. We also use the bidders' market-to-book ratio as an alternative measure of bidder stock overvaluation. We expect both measures to increase the acquirer's propensity to use stock to finance the purchase. Table 8 presents the results. We find that the local-advisor dummy has a negative coefficient of -9.461 that is statistically significant at the 5% level. This suggests that the presence of local advisors reduces the percentage of deal value paid by stock by about 9.5%, which is about 25% of the standard deviation of the percentage of deal value paid by stock in our sample (37.7%). These results support our hypothesis that bidders assisted by local advisors feel lesser need to use stock as the financing method to share overpayment risk with target shareholders, since the information advantage of local advisors enables them to mitigate the information asymmetry about target value and help bidders avoid overbidding.
With respect to the effects of other explanatory variables, we find that the acquirers pay a higher percentage of deal value with stock when they have experienced higher recent stock price run-up, which is consistent with our earlier conjecture. Acquirers also tend to pay a significantly higher percentage of deal value with stock when targets are from the high-tech industries, consistent with the greater information asymmetry associated with these targets.
Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the choices of financial advisors by U.S. acquirers in crossborder mergers and acquisitions. Specifically, we investigate the determinants and consequences of acquirer choices between financial advisors indigenous to target home countries (local advisors) and those foreign to target home countries (foreign advisors). Consistent with local advisors having an informational advantage, we find that cross-border acquirers are more likely to retain local advisors in transactions where they face greater information asymmetry and uncertainties as reflected by deal and target home country characteristics. Consistent with foreign advisors being more experienced and skilled in assisting acquirers in larger and more complex transactions, we find that they are more likely to be hired by acquirers taking over relatively larger targets. In addition to the demand-side factors driving local vs. foreign advisor choices, we also find that the probability of local advisor hiring is higher when there is a greater supply of them.
With respect to the consequences of local vs. foreign advisor hiring, we find that acquirers advised by local advisors experience significantly higher announcement-period abnormal stock returns and the result is largely concentrated in deals where acquirers have greater difficulties understanding and valuing targets. This suggests that in these transactions, the informational advantage of local advisors outweighs their possible deficiency in other aspects of M&A advising in comparison to foreign advisors. We also find that local advisor hiring reduces the propensity of acquirers to use stock as the method of payment, providing further evidence for the information advantage of local advisors and their ability to mitigate information asymmetry facing acquirers. (White (1980) ) and target country clustering (Petersen (2009) SDC) . The dependent variable is the 3-day acquirer cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement date. Local advisor is a dummy variable that equals one if bidders hire a local advisor, and zero otherwise. Definitions of other independent variables are in the Appendix. In parentheses are twosided p-values based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980) ) and target country clustering. *** , ** , and * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Both regressions control for year and acquirer industry fixed effects, whose coefficient estimates are suppressed for brevity.
(1) This table presents the results of a Heckman two-step regression of bidder returns. Panel A presents a probit regression of acquirers' decisions to hire advisors or not. The dependent variable equals one if bidders are assisted by financial advisors, and zero if bidders do not hire financial advisors. The sample used for the probit regression consists of 637 cross-border acquisitions by U.S. firms from 1990 to 2009. In 426 of them, acquirers hire financial advisors, and in 211 of them, acquirers do not hire financial advisors. Panel B presents an OLS regression of bidder returns with the inverse Mills' ratio (IMR) from the probit model as an additional explanatory variable. The dependent variable is the 3-day acquirer cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement date. Definitions of other independent variables are in the Appendix. In parentheses are two-sided p-values based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980) ) and target country clustering. 1990 and 2009 (listed in SDC) . The dependent variable is the proportion of deal value paid by stock. Local advisor is a dummy variable that equals one if an acquirer hires a homegrown bank from target home country and zero otherwise. Definitions of other independent variables are in the Appendix. In parentheses are two-sided pvalues based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980) 
